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Abstract 
Whether and how to disclose software vulnerability information has been debated intensely. An optimal 
disclosure policy should balance the tradeoff between its impact on software vendors' incentives and the 
potential risks imposed on customers. Previous research on software vulnerability primarily focused on the 
timing aspect of the disclosure policy. In this paper, we investigate another dimension -- the reputation 
aspect -- of the disclosure policy. We propose a disclosure mechanism integrated with a reputation system 
which reflects software security level. Reputation by itself can effectively provide an incentive for software 
vendors to fix vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the reputation operator can partially release vulnerability 
details to optimize social welfare. 
 
Keywords: Software vulnerability disclosure, patch, reputation systems, information security  
Introduction 
As computers and the Internet exert its influence in all realms of human endeavor, the rising security concerns have been 
eroding its value. Software vulnerabilities or flaws are the primary reason for security breaches. Currently software 
vulnerability information is disclosed through many sources, such as CERT/CC (Computer Security Incident Response 
Team/Coordination Center),1 Bugtraq mailing list,2 Secunia,3 and iDefence.4 There is a contentious debate on whether and 
                                                 
1 CERT/CC is a research center associated to Carnegie Mellow University and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
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how to disclose software vulnerabilities. Proponents of vulnerability disclosure claim that vulnerability disclosure can help 
users beware of potential security risks and take precautions, as well as provide software vendors incentives to develop and 
release patches in a timely manner. Opponents argue that vulnerability disclosure, especially without a patch, will expose 
customers to security risks as crackers (black-hat hackers) can easily identify and exploit the vulnerabilities. This paper 
studies the optimal vulnerability disclosure policy from an economic perspective. 
Current vulnerability disclosure sources follow different disclosure policies. CERT/CC and iDefense notify software 
vendors before they make the vulnerability information public. In contrast, Bugtrap and Secunia mailing lists instantaneously 
disclose vulnerability details, even links to exploit codes. The common characteristic of the above mechanisms is that 
vulnerability information is publicly disclosed, sooner or later. 
Vulnerability disclosure effectively expedites vendors' response. It, however, may cause dramatic damage to 
consumers. Crackers may devise attacks targeting at public vulnerabilities, especially unpatched ones. Even disclosing 
patched vulnerabilities may cause significant economic loss since customers may not apply the patch in a timely manner. 
How to disclose vulnerability information is a challenging issue. The disclosure source should balance the tradeoff 
between incentive effect and the potential risks associated with public vulnerabilities. Previous research on vulnerability 
disclosure primarily focused on one dimension -- the timing aspect -- of the disclosure policy. In this paper, we consider 
another dimension -- the reputation aspect -- of vulnerability disclosure. 
We propose a disclosure mechanism integrated with a reputation system for software security quality. The 
reputation system is operated by an infomediary, who is an independent third-party institution. Reputation scores are publicly 
observable and calculated according to the numbers of identified vulnerabilities and available patches. In each period, a 
vulnerability may be identified and reported to the infomediary by users. Once a vulnerability is reported, the infomediary 
informs the vendor. The vendor will determine whether to fix the vulnerability at a cost. At the end of each period, the 
infomediary updates the software's reputation score according to the vendor's response. In particular, when a vulnerability is 
identified and the vendor fails to releases a patch, the infomediary decreases the reputation score. When no vulnerability is 
identified and a patch is released for any previous vulnerability, the infomediary increases the reputation score. Otherwise, 
the reputation score stays constant. In addition, the infomediary may partially release vulnerability information.  
Customers can infer the security level of the software from the software's reputation. Therefore, the reputation score 
affects customers' willingness to pay, which in turn influences the vendor's incentive to develop patches. In addition, the level 
                                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.cert.org 
2 BugTraq is a full disclosure mailing list among security professionals. It is supported by SecurityFocus, a vendor-neutral site that 
provides security information to everyone at no charge. www.securityfocus.com/about 
3 Secunia is a privately held, financially profitable company which provides security solutions for businesses and governmental institutions. 
http://secunia.com 
4 iDefense Security & Vulnerability Research Labs is for-profit security company which provides security advisory to its subscribers. 
http://labs.idefense.com 
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of vulnerability details disclosed will moderate the impact of the reputation. When a higher degree of vulnerability details is 
disclosed, customers will suffer more heavily from unpatched vulnerabilities.  
By establishing a reputation system and controlling the disclosure level, our mechanism has the potential to improve 
software security from two aspects. First, the reputation effect can effectively provide software vendors incentives to fix 
vulnerabilities. Second, controlling the degree of vulnerability details disclosed potentially optimizes the security risks faced 
by customers. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on software vulnerability disclosure and 
reputation systems. In section 3, we formulate a model and derive some preliminary results. Section 4 describes the research 
plan. Finally we conclude the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
There is a stream of literature exploring various issues of software vulnerability disclosure. Arora et al. (2005) empirically 
show that the instant disclosure policy leads to earlier patch delivery. In another paper, Arora, et al (2005) use a game-
theoretic model to illustrate the incentive misalignment between software vendors and a social planner. They show that 
vendors always choose to patch less expeditiously than socially optimality and the social planner can shrink the protected 
period so as to push vendors to deliver patches in a timely manner. Kannan and Telang (2005) theoretically compare different 
vulnerability disclosure mechanisms, a CERT-type mechanism and a market-based mechanism (e.g., iDefense), and 
demonstrate that the latter, if not regulated, always underperforms the former. Our paper studies to what degree an 
infomediary should disclose vulnerability information, considering the vendor's incentive and customers' loss associated with 
the disclosure. 
Our work is also related to the literature on reputation systems. Reputation mechanisms have been extensively 
studied to deal with moral hazard and/or adverse selection issues (Friedman and Resnick 2001, Fudenberg and Levine 1992, 
Mailath and Samuelson 2001). Recently online reputation systems have been widely used in the electronic trading 
environment, such as online auction (e.g., eBay and eLance), online shopping search engines (e.g., BizRate and 
Pricegrabber), and online forum (e.g., Slashdot). Dellarocas (2005) discusses the issues regarding the design, evaluation and 
use of the Internet-based reputation mechanism from an economic perspective. Different from the consumer-feedback based 
reputation, Xu et al. (2007) introduce an audited reputation systems, where an auditor checks the quality of products and 
updates firms' reputations accordingly. Ekmekci (2005) designs a rating system to address the moral hazard issues in an 
adverse selection setting. The rating system can sustain the reputation effect and alleviate the moral hazard problem by 
censoring the feedback information (e.g., only releasing summary statistics, only showing the most recent data, refining the 
performance data into a binary form). Our paper develops a reputation system to address the moral hazard issue of a long-
3 
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lived software vendor. Differing from the aforementioned reputation literature, our paper concerns a product with cumulative 
quality. 
 
The Model 
We build up a game-theoretic model to examine the impact of the proposed mechanism on a vendor's behavior. We consider 
a setup with a long-lived software vendor who sells a software product to short-lived consumers in an infinite horizon. 
At the beginning of period t , , a vulnerability associated with the software may be discovered with 
probability s , 
1, 2,...,t = ∞
10 s≤ ≤  . We use b to indicate whether a vulnerability is discovered, with  representing a vulnerability 
discovered and  representing no vulnerability identified. The identified vulnerability will be reported to an infomediary. 
The infomediary, which aims at maximizing social welfare, informs the vendor and gives it one period to develop a patch. 
The vendor chooses whether or not to develop a patch at a cost c. If the vender invests in working on a patch, it can 
successfully develop a patch for the vulnerability with probability 
1b =
0b =
γ . We use  to indicate whether the investment is made, 
, with  representing investing. Denote  as the price of the software charged by the vendor at period t. The 
software vendor maximizes its long-term profit by the choice of  and . 
te
{0, 1te ∈ } 1te = tp
tp te
The infomediary employs a reputation score to evaluate the security level of the software. We use  to represent 
the score, where 
r R∈
{ },..., 1, 0R = −∞ − . At the end of period t, if a newly identified vulnerability is unpatched, the infomediary 
will decrease the reputation score by 1. If no vulnerability is discovered but a patch is released for a previous vulnerability, 
the infomediary adds 1 to the reputation score. Otherwise, the reputation score stays constant. Besides updating the reputation 
score in each period, the infomediary can publish the unpatched vulnerability at different levels of details. Let { }0, 1ty ∈  
represent the degree of vulnerability details disclosed.  is the infomediary's decision variable. ty
The timing of the events in each period is represented in Figure 1 . 
 
Customers 
purchase 
software 
Vulnerability 
is discovered 
Software vender is 
informed and hence 
exerts effort to 
develop the patch 
Patch is 
released 
Reputation 
is updated
Figure 1: Timing of the events in each period   
 
At the beginning of each period, a continuum of consumers enters the software product market. The customer's 
value for the software is v. Assume customers are heterogeneous in their value of the software and v follows a distribution 
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( )F v . The unpatched vulnerability is subject to crackers' attack. A customer losses z from an attack. 
Even though the infomediary does not release any detail about previous vulnerabilities, crackers can still discover 
and exploit the undisclosed vulnerabilities with probability h. It is plausible that the more information disclosed by the 
infomediary, the more likely crackers exploit the vulnerability. We model this information effect by assuming that the 
likelihood of getting attacked is increased to h y+ , provided that y degree of vulnerability detail is disclosed. 
Let ( )iu u r i= =  denote a consumer' willingness to pay for a product with reputation i.  
( )iu v z h y i= + +  
 At period t, consumers purchase the software if and only if 
demand across periods. Therefore, the optimal price the 
vendor c
Preliminary Analysis 
he value function, and 
i tu p≥ .  
For simplicity, we assume the vendor has a steady potential 
harges only depends on its reputation, and is independent of t. Similarly, the patching decision is also independent of 
t. We thus omit the index t, and instead use reputation i as a state variable. 
 
Denote ( ),jiV V r i b j≡ = = , t ( )i r iπ π≡ = , the current revenue. For a period with reputation score 
i , if a vu red,  lnerability is discove
( )1 1,max 1 , 0i i i ie pV ce eV e Vπ β γ γ −= − + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ i ≤                                                             (2) 
( )0 1,max 1 , 0i i i ie pV ce eV e Vπ β γ γ+= − + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ i <                                                              (3) 
V00 0,max ie pV ceπ β= − +                         
 where 
                                                             (4) 
β  is the discount factor.  
Denote ( )iV V r i≡ = , the expected value function.  
( )1i iV sV= 01 is V+ −  
Notice that patching does not affect the current revenue. There re, the pricing problem can be separated from the 
patching
termine the marginal type (consumer) when the reputation and the price of the software is  and 
fo
 decision. 
We can de i p  
respectively using (1) and the equation iu p= .  
( )iv p i h y z= − +                                                                                         (5) 
Therefore, the software vendor's revenue from current period is ( ) ( )( )1 1i ip v p p i h zπ α= − = − + + . The optimal 
5 
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price and the maximum revenue can be derived as follows. 
( )1
i
i
p∗
+=
2
h y z+
                                                                                       (6) 
( ) 2⎞1
2i
i h y zπ ∗ + +⎛= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
                                                                                   (7) 
Based on the vendor's value function and profit function, we c
patching decisi
esearch Plan and Conclusion 
y of using a reputation mechanism to improve software security. We use a game-
 
n the next step. First, we will consider the 
negative exte
s on the design of a 
reputation syste
eference 
hman, R., Telang, R. and Yang, Y. “An Empirical Analysis of Vendor Response to Software Vulnerability 
Arora R. “Does Information Security Attack frequency increase with Vulnerability 
Arora erability Disclosure.” Working Paper, 2005. 
an analyze the equilibrium price, the equilibrium 
on, and the design of the optimal reputation system. 
 
R
The study aims to demonstrate the feasibilit
theoretic model to illustrate that the reputation mechanism with a simple and proper measure can substitute direct
vulnerability disclosure and improve software security at a lower social cost. 
We will extend the baseline model by incorporating relevant elements i
rnality of security risks. Given a good reputation, there are two countervailing forces influencing a software 
vendor's profit. On one hand, a good reputation reflects high expected quality of the software, which in turn leads to higher 
willingness-to-pay and a larger number of customers. On the other hand, negative externality exacerbates the security 
problems, and subsequently lowers the willingness to pay and the number of customers. How the negative externality 
influences the design of the reputation system is unclear. Second, we will consider consumers who live for multiple periods. 
The customers purchase decisions are essentially durable good problem: they may purchase today or delay to the future, 
anticipating lower prices. An overlapping generation model will be implemented to explore that insight. 
Our paper could generate important implications. We will provide guidance for policy maker
m for software security and the writing of optimal vulnerability policy. Given the diverse practice of 
infomediaries on software security, our paper is of considerable significance by offering economic rationale. In addition, this 
study provides valuable managerial implication to software vendors in making optimal patching strategies in a long run. 
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